This paper analyses the effects of social security reforms on saving in Britain. Following the 1986 Social Security Act, the UK pension system has partially shifted from an unfunded basis towards a partially funded basis. Under the new pension scheme, individuals are given the option of contracting out of the earning related pension scheme into a personal pension plan comparable to the IRA pension plan existing in the US. Individuals are also given the possibility of making additional contributions to their pension plan. These contributions represent an attractive form of saving in that they receive a more generous tax treatment than other conventional forms of saving. We use the BHPS dataset for the years 1991 to 2003 to investigate the interactions between voluntary additional contributions to personal pension plans (PPP) and saving in conventional forms. In particular, we test whether contributions to the PPP crowd out saving or constitute additional saving. We estimate the determinants of the amount saved in conventional forms and for retirement purposes with different estimation strategies by allowing the two choices to be correlated. According to our findings, the introduction of private pension schemes has not exhibited a crowding out effect on private saving.
Introduction
The UK household saving rate has been stable at around 5% since the year 2000, after having reached its peak in 1992 (at 11%) and having then gradually declined until 1999
1 . The persistence of low saving rates has always worried economists, mainly because of the concern that households in their working age are possibly mistargeting the resources necessary to them during retirement. In order to avoid the consequences of this concern, government policies often aim at promoting retirement saving. The lack of resources during retirement, in fact, would entail a big burden either for the elderly left without vital resources or for society as a whole.
The rationale behind the introduction of a public pension system can be traced back to the paternalism principle (Diamond, 1977) according to which public provisions of pension income streams replace income flows during retirement. According to this view, public provision of retirement insurance appears superior from a social welfare point of view. However, as highlighted by Disney et al. (2000) , a comprehensive state pension provision has become unaffordable given the demographic transitions characterising industrialised countries 2 . A shift away from a comprehensive state pension provision to a partially funded system allows households more freedom in their savings for retirement decisions. Individuals have, in fact, more discretionary power in determining their personal saving for old age. This freedom in saving choice 1 See, also, Attanasio and Banks (1998) . 2 Social protection expenditures constitute a major part of public spending in all countries belonging to the European Union. Population ageing is a common factor among EU countries and it will impose an additional burden on European fiscal balances. Public pensions in most Western countries constitute a consistent fraction of GDP. For the 15 EU countries this amounted to 10.4 % in the year 2000, peaking at 14% for Austria and Italy. The only exceptions among the EU countries are the UK and Ireland, with a ratio of 4.6 percent and 5.5, respectively (OECD, 2003) . This difference is hardly explained by different demographic structures of the countries. The composition of private and public pension provision, the structure of the pension benefits, and the age of retirement are the crucial factors in determining the discrepancy of the pension burden among countries.
spontaneously raises economists' worries on whether household saving is sufficient to keep households' consumption at its permanent level after retirement.
The UK system, in contrast to the average European pension system, allows employees to have a high degree of choice in determining how much to save for retirement. However, consumers' choice can be affected by such irrational attitudes as myopia, leaving the household prone to the risk of being left without vital resources for the future. Would this discretion in choosing how much to save for retirement leave consumers alone in facing the consequences of wrong retirement planning, and, if so, to what extent?
In Britain, the percentage of households who do not save any resource for future consumption in conventional forms has increased over the past decade. This could be due to the crowding out effect of the introduction of personal pension plans (PPP), whose return is higher than the market rate. The crucial issue in analysing the interaction between conventional saving and retirement saving in voluntary contributions to the PPP is whether contributions to the PPP crowd out saving or constitute additional saving. As a special tax treatment makes retirement saving returns more favourable than conventional saving, consumers face the income and substitution effect when choosing the optimal amount of savings. A higher interest rate increases the attitude toward saving due to a substitution effect, at the same time, having more resources available, due to a higher interest rate, makes saving less attractive due to the income effect.
If markets are not perfect and credit constraints bind, we expect that those consumers who are rationed in the credit market will be affected by liquidity constraints in their pension and saving decisions. Pension asset is, in fact, illiquidable and therefore generates a non-disposable asset until retirement age (Gale 1998 Venti and Wise (1990) claim that the offsetting effect is almost non-existent. Gale and Scholtz (1994) found that the coefficient of substitution between IRAs and other assets rises with age, since the young face greater liquidity constraints. Samwick (1998) concludes that the coefficient of displacement found in the literature ranges between 0.2 and 0.5. In other words, an increase of one dollar in pension wealth reduces other assets by between 20 and 50 cents 3 .
In the UK, with the exception of Guariglia and Markose (2000) , no similar analysis has been performed. The authors claim that there is no evidence of a displacement effect on saving due to the introduction of personal pension plans. In fact, contributions to PPP are essentially made for retirement purposes, while saving in traditional forms is related to precautionary reasons. This paper departs from the analysis of Guariglia and Markose (2000) and extends it by considering the resources saved under different forms as the outcome of two jointly made decisions. The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the characteristics of the UK pension system, while Section 3 describes the motivations behind saving in different forms and the saving patterns of the British. Section 4 describes the dataset used and Section 5 explains the results obtained through the empirical analysis. Finally Section 6 concludes the paper.
The UK Pension system
In 1986 the Social Security Act introduced relevant changes that have since affected retirement decisions. These reforms have peculiarly characterised the UK pension system, within the OECD countries, with the allowance of great freedom in choosing the private pension provider. The UK is facing a much softer pension burden than the other European countries, one of the reasons being that the UK has one of the most attenuated state pension systems among its European partners, which co-exists with a well-established private funded pension system. Moreover, since the beginning of the 1980's restrictive policies have been applied to state pension provisions to reduce the risk of a pension crisis in the near future (Blake, 2000) .
The UK pension scheme is divided into three "tiers".
The first, a basic tier, contemplates a basic state flat rate. Benefits can be received at the age of 60 and 65, respectively for women and men. The earnings replacement ratio is about 12% for a single person, as a proportion of average earnings.
Couples receive a higher benefit, representing an earning replacement rate of about 20% 4 .
Pensioners can benefit from a supplementary pension through the second tier of the UK pension programme. Secondary provision is compulsory for all employees whose earnings are above the lower earning limit.
Three options are available under the second tier programme.
1) the State Earning Related Pension System (SERPS), an earning related programme contemplating very favourable benefits at the beginning, based on the best 20 years of earnings. As described by Disney et al. (1999) 2) a company pension plan. This is either a defined benefit plan type or since 1986 a defined contribution plan type.
3) since 1986 individuals can opt out of SERPS or company pension plans to buy a Personal Pension Plan from a private insurer. Individuals can almost costlessly switch between regimes. Personal Pension Plans are therefore directly comparable to the Individual Retirement Account (IRAs plans) existing in the US (see Blake 1995) .
The third tier of the pension system is given by discretionary individual additional payments to pension plans. Individuals can make additional contributions to a company pension plan (subjet to a limit, which depends on age and earning) or augment their plan through a separate insurer and they can make additional, tax relieved, contributions to Personal Pensions up to a certain fraction of their earnings (Disney 2000) . Additional voluntary contributions to pension plans, along with saving in more conventional forms, represent the variables on which the paper focuses.
Understanding Saving
The usual model for dealing with the intertemporal allocation of money over time is the life-cycle model. It is worth noting that the majority of savers save for no specific reason (nearly 42% of all savers). Life cycle saving is not, therefore, a priority for people accumulating resources. The second saving motive is for holidays. These additional resources put aside, however, do not represent saving, strictly peaking, as they will be wiped out during the year. Therefore the actual saving rate of the British household is even lower than that declared if we consider a year, instead of a month, as the reference period to measure saving.
5 See Samwick 1998. Precautionary saving is usually defined as the additional resources saved due to the variance of the shock affecting the uncertain income path (Deaton, 1992) . This is positive if the third derivative of the utility function is positive. In our text, precautionary saving is considered as the response to uncertainty. 6 One may argue that we should adopt a sceptical attitude to what people consider as the reasons for acting in a certain way. Individuals could just not be aware of the real reasons behind the act of accumulating resources, having to choose among some fixed categories of answers, which can, also, be interpreted subjectively. Table 2 3.1
indicates the incidence of having a personal pension plan according to the principal motive for saving. Interestingly, among those who claim to save for life cycle purposes (old age) almost 30% have subscribed to a pension plan. This could be evidence of a higher prudence level, relative to future drops in income, exhibited by those individuals who consider saving for retirement purposes a priority. Thus, people who save for old age are also planning their retirement resources through alternative forms of saving.
Private Pension Plans
Pension reforms worldwide have been characterised by a common denominator:
the attempt to move towards a system that relies more intensively on funded pensions.
Underlying this process there is a common belief that stimulating pension asset accumulation enhances aggregate savings. In a low saving rate context, as in the UK, governments try to stimulate additional household saving so that households reduce their risk of facing retirement with insufficient resources 8 . In industrialised countries, the increase in the age of the population drives policy makers to promote higher saving rates so that comfortable living standards can be granted to individuals by additional saving previously accumulated for longer retirement periods.
In the US, the introduction of Individual Retirement Accounts (IRA) in 1974, was motivated by the need for encouraging personal saving for retirement (see Venti and Wise, 1990 and Gravell, 1991) . Contributions to IRA are not taxed and interest compounded is tax free. In order to assess whether IRA, or, similarly, private pension plans, do generate additional savings it must be determined whether IRA plans are financed by new savings, from existing savings or from savings that would have been put aside in any case (see also Attanasio and DeLeire, 1994) . Do tax favoured pension plans generate net saving and, if they do, to what extent has the increase in saving taken place? A large body of economic literature has focused on the possible crowding out effect of the introduction of pension systems on private saving. It is well known that the effect of an increase in the interest rate on saving for net savers depends on the income and substitution effect. While the former acts to reduce saving, the latter acts in the opposite direction. The evidence reveals a mixed picture of the net saving effect due to the introduction of IRA.
One of the main impediments in determining whether the introduction of pension plans could generate additional saving is savers' heterogeneity. Due to different individuals' risk aversion, or, more generally, to widely different preferences among people, the effect of pension on personal saving could be driven by personal attitude towards saving in all its forms. If a positive effect on saving is observed after the introduction of personal pension plans, this could be due to a selection effect, households who save in conventional forms being more oriented towards saving in general. Controlling for individuals' hidden propensity to save, we can infer whether the introduction of personal pension plans causes a true displacement effect on personal saving.
The data
The BHPS was designed as a survey of a nationally representative sample of 10,000 adult members of approximately 5,500 households who were interviewed in 1991. The same individuals, together with their co-residents were then followed and reinterviewed in successive waves. Twelve waves are currently available, covering the years 1991 to 2003. The survey focuses, in particular, on household characteristics, such as participation in the labour market, income and wealth, health, education, and, more generally, on socio-economic status 9 .
We used eleven of the waves of the British Household Panel Survey covering the years 1992-2003 10 .
We restricted our sample to those employees aged between 20 and 65. We excluded the self-employed from the sample as it could be misleading to consider the saving of this category as personal saving instead of saving that could be reinvested in their firm. Moreover, no measure of usual net earnings for this category was available 11 .
After these restrictions, our sample consisted of 48521 person-year observations.
Descriptive statistics
The BHPS panel dataset collects some information on the financial decisions of 14 Only respondents who have subscribed a personal pension fund can make extra contribution to it. We have not taken into account the possible selection of the sample in our estimates.
Overall, around 12% of the respondents in our sample made additional contributions to their pension plan. Male respondents have a higher propensity for contributing to personal pension plans than female respondents. The probability of having a personal pension plan is at its minimum in the 20-24 age range. At age 45-49 the fraction of respondents who save in forms of pension is at its peak (14% of the sample).
Employees belonging to private companies exhibit higher rates of personal pension plan participation. Respondents belonging to higher income classes exhibit a higher probability of saving in non conventional forms (5% against 18% for the first and fifth quintile, respectively).
Empirical Results

Determinants of pension contributions and amount saved
In our empirical specification, we initially estimate our model by using Tobit regressions. We use a Tobit estimation technique as our variable of interest, savings, is only observed for positive values. Using the subscript i to indicate individual and t to indicate time, the optimal amount of resources saved is determined as follows:
( 1) S* it =X it 'β+γPC it +ε it S* is the amount individuals would save each month, though it is not observed when negative. Saving (S) is observed when positive (S=S*) and it is observed equal to zero when S* takes negative values.
The set of regressors used, X, are: A variable capturing the variability over time of the individual's income was added to the regressors set (var) 16 . This variable was derived as the variance of the error component of the income process using all the waves of the BHPS. More specifically, we constructed the variable VAR it according to the following procedure. We obtained the residuals from a random-effects regression of the respondent's usual net monthly earnings on his/her age, age squared, gender, regional dummies, educational dummies, 15 The questionnaire contains a question on the subjective perception of the future financial situation (variable fisitx) 16 We also tried to control for unemployment spells, but the percentage of those who are employed and experienced unemployment spells in the past was too small. occupational dummies, and interactions of the last two groups of dummies with age. We then calculated the sample variance of these residuals in the four or more years before the year t, the year of the interview 17 . The rationale behind the introduction of the variance term relates to precautionary motives for saving. If the expected downturns in income are captured by financial status expectations and are responsible for the traditional saving for "a rainy day", an additional motive for saving arises if individual is risk averse. In fact, as shown in the closed form solution found by Caballero (1990), saving is enriched by an additional component, the variance of the disturbance to the income process, which enhances consumption growth if agents are prudent. Controlling for the precautionary motive for saving allows us to determine whether individuals exhibit a higher saving rate due to the presence of uncertainty. More importantly, we are also able to distinguish whether these motives directly enter both savings equations and what their incidences are in influencing saving in conventional forms or in personal pension fund forms.
Savings is also regressed on an additional regressor, PC, equal to the amount saved in a specific form: the resources put aside as an additional contribution to a personal pension plan.
One of the main problems arising when estimating such a model with this technique is that we do not consider the endogeneity of the variable PC. Given that the two saving decisions are correlated, if we did not take the correlation into account the coefficient of the dummy variable PC would not be consistent. The way we deal with the endogeneity issue is by jointly estimating the two equations by Maximum Likelihood 18 and allowing the two error terms to be correlated. If saving is mainly a response to future drops in income due to retirement, as Modigliani's original intuition suggests, those individuals who are not covered by a pension plan should exhibit a higher saving rate than those who are covered. In order to take into account the simultaneity of the decision processes and to determine whether individuals who save in pension forms and those who do not differ in their saving behaviour, we suppose that the amount of resources the agents put aside in pension plans enters the saving equation model both directly and indirectly via the errors correlation term. Denoting the (latent)
propensity to save in ordinary forms and pensions with S* and PC*, respectively, and the observed corresponding variables with S and PC, we jointly estimate the following two equations:
( 2) S* it =X it 'β+γPC* it +ε it where S=S* if S*>0 , S=0 otherwise ( 3) PC it *=W it 'ϕ+ ν it where PC=PC* if PC*>0, PC=0 otherwise X it , W it are the sets of regressors referring to characteristics of individual i at time t, β and ϕ the parameter vectors; ε and ν the two error terms.
The two error terms are distributed according to a bivariate normal distribution, with a correlation coefficient that we are going to estimate. The correlation of the two error terms allows us to take into account the individual propensity to save in any form.
In equivalent terms, a positive coefficient γ, could be due to the fact that those individuals who save in conventional forms are, also, more likely to save in the form of pensions plans.
This specification allows us to detect the direct impact of pension contributions on saving which, if negative, measures the displacement effect on saving due to the introduction of the PPP 19 .
The structure of the model in equation (2) 20 implies that the propensity to contribute to personal pension plans rather than the actual amount added into the plan has an impact on the decision on saving in conventional forms. One could argue that the result of the action, which is the observed counterpart (PC) of the latent variable (PC*),
and not the sentiment towards an action should be used as an explanatory variable for saving. However, as highlighted in Maddala (1983) , the correct specification of the econometric model should be based on a theoretical model according to which saving decisions are formulated. We argue that preferences for saving in pension and not the observed choice drive other saving decisions. For this reason, we use the latent propensity and not the action taken by the individual as the explanatory variable entering the saving equation.
Due to the censoring, we can divide our sample into the following four categories (we avoid the subscript i for easier notation):
Category 1: The individuals who save and contribute to a private pension plan, such that:
S* = X'β+γPC*+ε = X* it 'δ + η it >0 and PC*=W'ϕ+ ν > 0. 19 The structural model is considered, instead of a reduced form model, so that we are able to measure the direct impact of savings in pension form on other types of saving. In this way, we are able to detect whether the two forms of saving are considered substitutes or complements. For a similar approach, see Starr-McCluer (1996) . 20 Substituting the expression for PC into equation (2), we obtain: X it ' β + γ PC* it +ε it = X it ' β + γ (W it ' ϕ +ν it ) + e it = X* it 'δ + η it, where η it = γ i ν t +ε it Category 2: The individuals who do not save and do contribute to pension plans, such that:
S* = X'β+γPC*+ε =X* it 'δ + η it <0 and PC*=W'ϕ+ ν>0.
Category 3:
The individuals who save and do not contribute to a private pension plan, such that:
S* = X'β+γPC*+ε = X* it 'δ + η it >0 and PC*=W'ϕ+ ν < 0.
Category 4:
The individuals who do not save and do not contribute to a private pension plan, such that:
S* = X'β+γPC*+ε= X* it 'δ + η it <0 and PC*=W'ϕ+ ν < 0.
Denoting with φ(.), φ2(.), Φ(.), and Φ2(.) the univariate and bivariate normal density function; and the univariate and bivariate cumulative distribution, respectively; with σ η 2 and σ ν 2 , the variance of η it and  ν it , with σ ην , the covariance between η and v, and with ρ the correlation coefficient between η it and   ν it ; the probabilities associated with each of the four categories can be written as follows: The reason behind the choice of the type of work variables is the following.
Private company employees could show a different propensity for personal pension plans than civil servants, due to a minor stability. Moreover, employers often offer subscription to a private pension plan as a type of benefit for the employee. Table 4 and Table 5 . illustrate the estimate results corresponding to the Tobit and Maximum Likelihood models, respectively. The sign and the magnitude of the regressors are very similar in both specifications. As already exposed, the Tobit model does not take into account the endogeneity of contributing to pension schemes, thus our preferred model is the one estimated through maximum likelihood, which jointly estimates the two saving outcomes. The maximum likelihood model being our preferred specification, our comments refer to the findings of the latter.
Regressions Results
A more prosperous financial future stimulates higher current consumption levels and, therefore, a smaller amount of resources saved, as predicted by the LCPIH theory.
This variable has a detrimental effect on pension contributions, by reducing them by 17£, while it does not significantly impact ordinary saving 21 . One explanation for this finding is that savings in ordinary forms respond more to transitory fluctuations than permanent ones. If respondents perceive a better financial situation in the future, this could be the result of a better permanent financial situation for the family, and therefore less need for accumulating asset for retirement.
A benefit pension scheme offered by the employer reduces the incentive to additionally contribute to retirement savings (variable emplo_yes in the first equation).
The employer's pension scheme could therefore be considered as a substitute for a personal pension plan.
A good health status positively affects pension contributions. The perception of a good health status increases the willingness to save in both forms. This could be in contrast to the traditional role of saving namely saving for a "rainy day". According to the traditional life cycle predictions, respondents who perceive their health status as being good, should also exhibit a lower saving rate, compared to those individuals with worse future health expectations. If subjective perception of health condition is a good proxy for future health conditions, respondents with poor health should be more prone to the consequences of a future lack of resources, due to higher medical expenses, and therefore should save more than healthy respondents. One explanation for this finding could be related to life expectancy. Perception of own health status could proxy life expectancy; thus we would expect individuals who expect to live longer to save more than others.
The variance of income negatively affects only conventional savings in a significant way, suggesting that higher income variance decreases savings instead of enhancing them, as the precautionary motives for saving would suggest. Once different forms of saving are modelled jointly and considered as the outcome of a common process, precautionary motives to save do not represent a channel through which individuals accumulate additional saving.
Turning, finally, to the displacement effect on saving (measured by the coefficient γ  ) due to the existence of alternative forms of saving, we observe that pension contributions have an enhancing effect on saving in other forms, by increasing the latter by almost a pound. An additional pound invested in pensions would increase saving by up to a pound for the savers 22 . 22 The marginal effect of an additional pound of pension saving on saving in other forms is calculated by simulating the expected value of saving, conditional on having positive pensions and saving, by an increase of a pound of pension contributions. Given the specification of the model, we could estimate the total effect of a change of each regressor entering each equation. An increase of a pound in monthly income, for example, would increase saving both directly and indirectly through its impact on pension, via the parameter γ.
In other words, an additional pound put aside in a pension plan would have no detrimental effect on saving, but would actually increase it. The two products of saving are therefore complementary and not substitutes, as those respondents who save in pension forms also have higher savings.
The fact that saving decisions are correlated via their error terms is confirmed by the coefficient ρ, which is equal to 5%. Those individuals who are more inclined to conventional saving do also show a higher propensity for other forms of saving. After accounting for this effect, which could have been responsible for the enhancing effect of saving, we still find no detrimental effect on saving due to pension plans. The sign of the coefficient γ indicates that, in addition to a natural propensity for saving that differs among individuals (captured by the coefficient ρ), savings in pension plans does not substitute savings in conventional forms. The no displacement result given by the Tobit analysis, where pensions were treated as an exogenous variable, is thus confirmed.
From a policy standpoint it is important to provide the policy maker with estimates of the degree of substitutability of different forms of saving. In the presence of a displacement effect, total household saving could also be depressed by the introduction of such forms of pension schemes. The empirical evidence shows that not only is this effect not observed, but the existence of such plans seems to have an additional effect on conventional saving. However, if household savings are not affected in a negative way by these pension reforms, households with no pension coverage have no other conventional forms of saving either. Therefore, if a natural concern on the effect of pension reforms exists, this should not be related to the ability of creating saved resources, but, on the contrary, to the inability of targeting those households more prone to the risk of being left without resources after retirement.
Conclusions
This paper inspects saving behaviour in Britain by using the last twelve available waves of the BHPS panel dataset.
We focus on the determinants of saving in conventional forms and on the forms of pensions as two decisions taken simultaneously by the household. The aim of this analysis is to shed some light on the displacement effect on saving due to the introduction of the personal pension plans (PPP). As the two decisions have in common the specific individual's unobserved preference toward saving, the econometric specification adopted allows us to control for this effect. In estimating the direct impact of additional contributions on personal pension plans, we are able to detect whether there is a pure crowding out effect once we control for the hidden propensity to save in any form.
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that the contributions to personal pension plans have not offset other forms of saving. Our estimates, in fact, show a positive correlation between saving in conventional forms and saving in the form of contributions to personal pension plans. This suggests that the crowding out effect is not only non existent, but, more surprisingly that such forms of retirement saving enhance saving in other forms as well. This conclusion is supported both by the descriptive statistics and by the statistic empirical analysis described and performed in this paper.
Controlling for individual characteristics, household's characteristics, and risk attitude we found that the effect of an additional pound contributed to personal pension plan stimulates saving in conventional forms. Individuals do not consider retirement saving as an alternative form of saving; they treat the two forms of saving as complements 23 instead of substitutes when deciding the amount of resources to put aside. These findings are in line with the previous literature focusing both on American households (among others, see Venti and Wise 1990 ) and on British households (see Guariglia and Markose 2000) . One explanation of this empirical evidence is that individuals consider saving for retirement as distinct from other forms of saving, which might be motivated by more short-term needs.
Another consequence of these findings is that the observed decline in the saving rate cannot be attributed to any displacement effect of the alternative forms of saving.
Without the existence of personal pension plans households' saving rates would have been even lower. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% a. Additional contribution to personal pension plan was derived from the following variables: penadv if the respondent has a personal pension (variable ppp==1) plan and started it after 1988 and made additional contributions to her plan; penb4v if the respondent has a personal pension plan and started it before 1988 (penb4=1).
